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Abstract
Cloud computing is a globalised concept and there are no borders within the
cloud. Computers used to process and store user data can be located anywhere on
the globe, depending on where the capacities that are required are available in the
global computer networks used for cloud computing. Because of the attaractive
features of cloud computing many organizations are using cloud storage for storing
their critical information. The data can be stored remotely in the cloud by the
users and can be accessed using thin clients as and when required.One of the
major issue in cloud today is data security in cloud computing.Storage of data in
the cloud can be risky because of use of Internet by cloud based services which
means less control over the stored data. One of the major concern in cloud is how
do we grab all the benefits of the cloud while maintaining security controls over
the organizations assets.
Our aim is to propose a more reliable, decentralized light weight key man-
agement technique for cloud systems which provides more effecient data security
and key management in cloud systems. Our proposed technique provides better
security against byzantine failure, server colluding and data modification attacks.
Keywords: Cloud security; key management; server colluding attacks; Byzantine
failure;
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
According to NIST [1] Cloud computing is a model for convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., net-
works, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.
In cloud computing data and applications are maintained with the use of cen-
tral remote server and internet and allows consumers to use the applications with-
out installating and also with the help of internet cloud computing allows cus-
tomers to access their personal files which are stored in some other computer.
Yahoo email, Gmail, or Hotmail etc are examples of cloud computing. The email
management software and the server are fully managed and controlled by the CSP
Google, Yahoo etc and are all on the cloud ( internet) .
The chapter 1 is organized as follows. In section 1.2 classifications of cloud
computing is discussed. Section 1.3 discusses the architecture of cloud computing.
In section 1.4 characteristics of cloud computing is discussed. Section 1.5 covers
the security issues and risks in cloud computing. In section 1.6 the motivation of
this work is discussed and section 1.7 covers the problem statement. In section
1.8 the outline of thesis is discussed.
1.2 Classifications of Cloud Computing
It can be classified in following two ways [1]:
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1. Deployment Model
2. System Model
1.2.1 Deployment models
Based on the deployment the cloud can be of following types.Different types are
clouds are described below:
1. Public cloud: The cloud vendor hosts the computing infrastructure at
its own premises and the customer dont have any control on where the
computing infrastructure is hosted. The computing infrastructure is open
for use by general public or different organizations share this computing
infrastructure.
2. Private cloud: Computing infrastructure is not shared between the orga-
nizations. It is dedicated to a particular organization and is therefore more
secure but expensive than public clouds. The two types of private clouds
are described below.
Externally hosted private clouds are hosted by some third party that special-
izes in cloud infrastructure and are also exclusively used by one organization.
On-premise private clouds are hosted by the enterprise itself and are more
expensive as compared to externally hosted private clouds.
3. Hybrid cloud: The cloud infrastructure in hybrid cloud is a synthesis of
two or more unique cloud infrastructures that are bounded together by some
standardized technology that empowers application and data portablility.
4. Community cloud: The cloud infrastructure is solely utilized by con-
sumers from organization that have related or imparted concerns. Commu-
nity cloud may be overseen, managed and worked by a third party or one or
a greater amount of organizations in the community or some consolidation
of them.
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1.2.2 Service models
Different service delievery models in Cloud Computing are shown in figure 1.1.
1. Software as a Service(SaaS):
In SaaS model consumer has the proficience to utilize applications of supplier
that are running on a cloud infrastructure. A program interface can be used
to access the applications through various client devices. Operating systems,
storage, servers, network or other underlying cloud infrastructure are not
overseen by the consumer.
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS): Consumer is given the capability to de-
ploy onto the cloud infrastructure created by the consumer or applications
acquired that are created using services, libraries, programming languages
and tools supported by the provider.The underlying cloud infrastructure in-
cluding storage, operating systems, servers, network controlled by the con-
sumer
3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): Consumer has the capability to pro-
vision computing resources like networks, storage, processing etc where the
consumer can deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include applica-
tions and operating systems. The underlying cloud base is not overseen or
controlled by the customer however the consumer has control over deployed
applications,storage and operating systems.
1.3 Cloud computing architecture
The architecture comprises of many loosely coupled cloud components. Cloud
can be broadly classified into two parts front end and the back end [3]. Client
part of the cloud computing system is referred to as front end which consists
of the applications and interfaces that are needed for accessing cloud computing
platforms, e.g., Web Browser. Back end alludes to cloud itself and comprises
of every last one of resources that are obliged to give cloud computing services.
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It comprises of virtual machines, huge data storage, virtual machines, security
mechanism, services, servers ,deployment models and so forth. These ends are
typically connected through a network, normally connected by means of Internet.
Back end is responsible to provide protocols, traffic control and built-in security
mechanism. The server employs certain protocols, known as middleware, that
helps the devices that are connected to communicate and correspond with each
other.
1.4 Characteristics of Cloud Computing
1. Broad network access: Various client platforms like laptops,tablets,mobile
phones can be used to access these capabilities that are available over the
network.
2. On-demand self-service: Without the human interaction with each ser-
vice provider a consumer can provision computing capabilities automatically
as and when required, for example server time and network storage.
3. Location Independence Customer: dont have any control or knowledge
of where the resources are located exactly but may have some control at a
higher level of abstraction Consumer can control on which country or state
the data should be stored.
4. Resource pooling: Multiple consumers are served with the providers pooled
computing resources using a model, with different virtual and physical re-
sources dynamically assigned and reassigned depending on the demand of
consumer.
1.5 Security Issues And Risks In Cloud Com-
puting
Gartner in 2008 recognized seven security issues [4] that need to be tended to
before organizations switch completely to the cloud computing model.
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1. Data location: While storing data in cloud some clients might not know
where their data is actually located.
2. Regulatory compliance: Customers can choose between providers that
permit to be examined by third party organizations that check levels of
security provided by cloud service providers.
3. Data segregation: Since the data in encrypted form from different or-
ganizations may be stored in the same place, so a system is required that
separates data from different organizations and it should be provided by the
cloud service provider.
4. Long-term viability: It alludes to the capability to withdraw an agreement
and all information if the current supplier is bought out by another firm.
5. Investigative support: In case a customer suspects defective movement
from the supplier, he might not have numerous legitimate ways seek after
an investigation.
6. Recovery: Each supplier ought to have a disaster recovery convention to
ensure client data is protected in case of a disaster also.
7. Privileged user access: Data transmitted from the customer through the
Internet represents a certain level of risk, in view of issues of information
possession; ventures ought to invest time getting to know their suppliers
and their regulations however much as could be expected before allotting
some trivial applications.
Risks In Cloud Computing
The six specific areas of cloud computing where substantial security attention is
required is are as foolows
1. Security of data in transit.
2. Security of data at rest.
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3. Cloud legal and regulatory issues.
4. Robust separation between data belonging to different customers.
5. Authentication of users/applications/processes.
6. Incedent response.
1.6 Motivation
The information and data that is stored on the Cloud is important to people
with noxious intent so security is very important in cloud environment. A consid-
erable measure of conceivably secure information and particular data is put away
on Pcs, and this basic data is currently being put away and exchanged to Cloud.
So understanding the security measures that the Cloud provider uses is very im-
portant. The principal thing that must be dealt with is the efforts to establish
safety that the cloud supplier recently has set up. These efforts to establish safety
that cloud service provider give change from supplier to supplier and around the
different types of Clouds. Some of the important issues [6] are:
1. What are the encryption methods that providers are using?
2. How is the actual hardware where data wil be stored is protected?
3. Is the backup provided for data that is stored in cloud?
4. Are the firewalls set up?
5. In case of a community Cloud, how is the information from one company
separated from other company?
Standard terms and conditions as characterized by the cloud suppliers may ad-
dress these inquiries. The home client for the most part have exceptionally little
negotiation room to talk about the terms and condition in their Cloud contract
while a small business client generally have slightly more room to discuss terms
and conditions and large have marginally more room to examine the terms of their
7
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agreement with the supplier and will have the capacity to pose these questions
throughout that time. By subscribing to the Cloud the control of data is given to
some outside source. This separation between cloud user and the physical location
of information stored in cloud makes a hindrance and in the meantime more space
is made for an outsider to get to critical data. Therefore, currently security is one
of the biggest challanges in cloud computing. However, to take the advantage of
the benifits provided by the cloud it is required to transfer the direct control of
users data in the cloud.
1.7 Problem statement
Objective to improve the key management and data security in cloud comput-
ing based on advanced secret sharing key management algorithm. Our proposed
method helps to give better fault tolerance against Byzantine attacks,server col-
luding and data modification attacks.
1.8 Organisation of thesis
The thesis is organized in the following way chapter 2 describes the existing ar-
chitecture and literature review that was done for this thesis.In chapter 3 the
proposed model and how the methods is applied to make system more secure is
discussed. In Chapter 4 the implementationand results are discussed. Finally
chapter 5 concludes with the summary of work done.
1.9 Conclusion
In this chapter overview of cloud computing is given which includes types of clouds,
characteristics of cloud, architecture of cloud, security and risk issues, motivation
and objective of our work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
One of the most challenging problems of cloud service solicitation is to persuade
users to trust the security of cloud service and upload their sensitive data. Al-
though cloud service providers can claim that their services are well-protected
by elaborate encryption mechanisms, traditional cloud systems still cannot per-
suade the users that even if the cloud servers are compromised, the data are still
securely protected [17]. Key management is the toughest part to manage in cryp-
tosystems.In order to manage the encryption keys securely, enterprises need to
employ encryption in their cloud environment, while maintaining secure off-site
storage of their encryption keys.Keys should never be stored in the same place
as encrypted data. The keys used for encrypting sensitive customer data should
be managed effectively by periodic key rotation, and re-encryption of data with
new keys. Employees should be not be given more access than what is needed to
complete their tasks.
Morsy et al, 2010 investigated cloud computing problems from the cloud archi-
tecture [13], cloud offered characteristics, cloud stakeholders, and cloud service
delivery models perspectives.
This chapter is organized as follows:Section 2.2 discusses the key management
challanges in cloud. Section 2.3 and section 2.4 introduces the types of key man-
agement schemes and issues in cloud systems. In section 2.5 solution to these
security issues is discussed. Section 2.6 and 2.7 discusses the need of secret shar-
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ing schemes and different types of secret sharing schemes respectively. In section
2.8 required background concepts are discussed. Section 2.9 discusses the problems
with existing secret sharing and section 2.10 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Cryptographic Key Management Challenges
in the Cloud
One of the critical aspect of cloud computing is the secure management of the
resources that are associated with cloud services. One of the main tasks of secure
management is cryptographic operations. Hence, while self configurable resources,
elastic capablities and ubiquitous computing isprovided by cloud services at a lower
cost, they also entail performing several cryptographic operations for the following:
 To provide secure storage of data that is processed by those services.
 To provide secure interaction of the cloud consumer with various services.
The above functions [12] can increase the complexity of the key management
system (KMS) required to support the cryptographic operations for these func-
tions for the above because differences in control and ownership of underlying
infrastructures on which the resources and KMS are located.
2.3 Types of key management scheme
Selective distribution of keys and encryption that is utilized for security of critical
information is a essential system for restricting access to data. Data information
is given to encryption algorithm and a few transformations are performed on it
utilizing a cryptographic key. A figured content is produced in this procedure.
There is no simple approach to recover the original message from the figured
content other than by knowing the right decryption key [14].
There are a few diverse methodologies to group key management and these
could be partitioned into three fundamental classes:
1. Centralized group key management protocols: In this protocol single
entity controls the whole group, hence this protocol minimizes the bandwidth
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utilization computational power, storage requirements, on both server and
client sides.
2. Decentralized architectures: In decentralized architectures a large group
is separated into small subgroups and these subgroups are overseen separate
subgroup administrators which minimizes the issue of concentrating the work
load in a solitary spot.
3. Distributed key management protocols: In this architecture the key
management task is performed by the members themselves and no explicit
KDC is required[8].
2.4 Issues with key management in cloud Sys-
tems
Key management is the toughest part to manage in cryptosystems. Some of the
issues [15] with encryption key management in the cloud.
 In the cloud platform, there is always a possibility of insider attack. Keys
can be accessed or stolen by employees without the knowledge of end users.
 The keys for all accounts need to be managed properly. The challenge is to
index proper accounts with their respective keys, quickly and effectively.
 Another issue with key management is availability. If a system goes oﬄine,
then how the keys will be accessed? There needs to be key cache in order to
retrieve keys, even in the event that a system goes oﬄine.
 Byzantine failure [17] is very common fault in cloud servers . A storage
server can fail in arbitrary ways when this kind of fault occurs.
 Server colluding and data modification attacks are also very common in
clouds in which the storage servers can be compromised by the adversary,
as a result of which files can be modified .
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2.5 Solution to the security issues
 In order to manage the encryption keys securely, enterprises need to em-
ploy encryption in their cloud environment, while maintaining secure off-site
storage of their encryption keys.
 Encryption keys should never be stored in the same place as encrypted data.
The keys used for encrypting sensitive customer data should be managed
effectively by periodic key rotation, and re-encryption of data with new
keys.
 Employees should be not be given more access than what is needed to com-
plete their tasks.
Byzantine failure is very common fault in cloud servers,in which a storage server
can fail in arbitrary ways. On occurance of a byzantine failure system responds in
an unpredictable way[19]. At the point when a Byzantine failure has happened,
the framework may react in any erratic way, unless it is intended to have Byzantine
fault tolerance. The cloud is also inclined to data modification and server colluding
attack in which the storage servers can be compromised by the adversary, as a
result of which dat files can be modified as long as they are internally consistent.
For providing secure storage of data in cloud storage server , the data should be
encrypted.
2.6 Need of Secret Sharing schemes
In 1968, Liu [8] considered the following problem: Eleven scientists are working
on a secret project. They wish to lock up the documents in a cabinet so that the
cabinet can be opened, if and only if, six or more of the scientists are present.
What is the smallest number of locks needed? What is th smallest number of keys
to the locks each scientist must carry ?
If five scientists are considered together and there is a specific lock which they
cannot open. If we consider a particular scientist, he must have the keys of those
13
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locks which cannot be opened by any five scientists from among the other ten
scientists. Five scientists among 11 scientists can be selected in 11C5=462 ways,
and among ten scientists, five scientists can be selected in 10C5 = 252 ways. So,
the minimal solution requires 462 locks and 252 keys per 14 scientist. This is
clearly impractical, and if number of scientists increases it can become exponen-
tially worse.
2.7 Secret Sharing Schemes
Different secret sharing schemes are discussed below:
 Simple secret sharing
1. Additive Secret Sharing
In additive secret sharing for a given secret SF,n 1 random integers
R =r1, r2...... rn−1 are selected by the dealer uniformly from F. X then
computes
Sn = S − Σn−1i=0 rimodF
X sends the share si = ri to each player Pj 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 ,and the
share sn is sent to Pm The secret S reconstruction is trivial and it can
be generated simply by adding all the shares together.
S = Σni=0simodF In this scheme contribution of shares from all the
participants is required in order to reconstruct the secret. The original
share cannot be recovered in case if one or more of the participants
are missing, A scheme in which contribution of all the participants is
required is known as a perfect secret sharing scheme.
2. Threshold secret sharing scheme
In 1979 Shamir [7] and Blakley [16] introduced the concept in order
to make the message more secure. In this scheme, the message MG
is divided into n pieces MG1;MG2;MG3; : : : ;MGn, with or witout
ransformation of the message, in such a way that, for a specifed k,
14
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(2 ≤ k ≤ n), 1. knowledge of any k or more pieces MGi makes MG
computable; 2. knowledge of any k -1 or fewer MGi pieces leaves MG
completely undetermined.
This scheme is called a (k; n)-threshold scheme. The parameter k in
(k,n) is called the threshold value.
3. The Asmuth and Bloom Secret Sharing Scheme Asmuth and
Bloom proposed a scheme[11] in which modular arithmetic is used to
share the secret between parties and Chinese remainder theorem isused
for the reconstruction of the original secret. Keys are also known as
shadows.
2.8 Background concepts
2.8.1 Lagrange polynomial
For polynomial interpolation lagrange polynomials are used in numerical analysis.
When a set od distinct points xj and numbers yj are given, the Lagrange poly-
nomial is the polynomial of the least degree that at each point xj assumes the
corresponding value yj
When a set of p+1 data points are given
(x0, y0),. . . ,(xj, yj),. . . ,(xp, yp) where no two xj are the same, the interpolation
polynomial in the Lagrange form is a linear combination
L(x) :=
∑p
j=0 yj`j(x) of Lagrange basis polynomials
`j(x) :=
∏
0≤m≤p
m 6=j
x−xm
xj−xm =
(x−x0)
(xj−x0) · · ·
(x−xj−1)
(xj−xj−1)
(x−xj+1)
(xj−xj+1) · · ·
(x−xp)
(xj−xp) ,
where 0≤j≤ k.
2.8.2 Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s threshold sharing scheme is based on theidea that in order to define a line
two points are sufficient, in order to define a parabola three points are suffcient,
4 points to define a cubic curve and so forth.So in order to define a polynomial of
degree k-1, k points are sufficient.
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Suppose we want to use a (k,n) threshold scheme to share our secret S, without
loss of generality assumed to be an element in a finite field F of size P. Choose
at random k-1 positive integers a1, · · · , ak−1 with ai, and let a0=S. Build the
polynomial f(x)=a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 + · · ·+ ak−1xk−1. Let us construct any n
points out of it, for instance set i = 1, · · · , n to retrieve (i,f(i)). Every participant
is given a point (an integer input to the polynomial, and the corresponding integer
output). Given any subset of k of these pairs, we can find the coefficients of the
polynomial using interpolation. The secret is the constant term a0.
2.9 Problems with existing secret sharing scheme
The concept of secret sharing scheme was developed by Shamir [7] and Blakley [16]
in 1979 in order to keep the secret efficiently and safely. Lagrange interpolating
polynomial is the basis of shamir secret sharing , while blakely secret sharing is
based on the Linear projective geometry. Some of the drawbacks in both these
secret sharing schemes [7] and [16] are as follows: 1. A fake shadow may be dis-
tributed to a certain participant by a dishonest dealer and then the true secret
would never be obtained by that participant.
2. A fake share may be provided by a malicious participant to other participants,
and so the troe secret can only be reconstructed by the malicious participant.
2.10 Conclusion
If a single KDC is used it may become a point of failure. In addition to it because of
the large number of users it becomes difficult to maintain a single key distribution
center .Therefore in in this proposed work we try to emphasize on decentralized
approach in clouds while distributing secret keys and attribute to users.
16

Chapter 3
Proposed Technique
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the main entities in
the proposed model. Section 3.3 describes the cloud manager and the submodules
in it. In section 3.4 the share renewal phase is discussed. Section 3.5 describes the
voting technique used to ensure integrity of the shares. In section 3.6 the working
of proposed model is described in detail. In section 3.7 the advantages of proposed
system over existing systems is described. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Main entities in proposed model
The main entities in the proposed algorithm are cloud users, cloud storage server,
cloud manager, keysplitter servers, share holder servers, security servers, log editor
which are defined in detail as follows:
1. User: The user can create, update and delete his/her profile, store and
retrieve the data.
File Info UsersShare(xu) UsersShare(f(xu))
2. Cloud Storage Server: It is a model of data storage on virtualized storage
pools or servers located remotely. Cloud storage can be used by users to store
their data. Users can buy storage capacity from the cloud hosting companies.
The main responsibilities of cloud storage server are storing the encrypted
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document, storing the splitted encryption key values for the purpose of key
management .
3. Key Management Server: Key splitter server splits the encryption keys
into different shares and store the splitted keys in different share holder
servers.
CloudUser Id File Info ShareHldrServer Id
4. Share Holder Server: These servers stores the shares for the different keys
for different users. Share holders can be of two types. Primary share holder
directly receive the shares from the cloud manager. Secondary share holders
are the share holders at the leaf level and these share holders receive their
shares through primary share holders.
CloudUser Id File Info xi f(xi)
5. Log editor:
It checks the share holder servers timely to see if the shares are getting
modified.
ShareHldServer Id CloudUser Id Value(t-60) Value(t) Value Status
6. Security server: It has the encryption decryption algorithm.
Encryption process
Step 1- Split the letter of modified plaintext.
Step 2- Assign the position(i) of the letter.
Step 3- Generate the ASCII value of plaintext letter.
Step 4- E=(p+k+i)
p-plaintext, k-shared key, i-position
Step 5- Generate the ASCII character of the corresponding decimal value
in the result from the above given formula.This would be the cipher text.
Decryption process
Step 1- Generate the ASCII value of the cipher text character.
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Step 2- Same encryption key is used.
Step 3- Assign the position i of the cipher text.
Step 4- D=((c-k-i)+256)
p-plaintext, k-shared key, i-position.
Step 5 Generate the ASCII character of the corresponding decimal value
in the result from the above given formula.This would be the original plain
text.
Log editor checks in period of 60 sec if any share gets updated. If no key
updates are performed the primary share holders are used in decryption
process. If a primary share holder gets updated other primary share holders
are also checked. If more than half are unchanged the unchanged values are
used. Table 3.1 shows the actions that should be performed for different
values of primary and secondary share holders.
Table 3.1: Actions to be performed for different values of primary and secondary
share holders.
PrimaryShareHolder SecondaryShareHolder Action
Unchanged Unchanged Trusted
Changed Changed Use another share holder
Unchanged Changed Trusted
Changed Unchanged Regenerate primary from secondary
3.3 Cloud Manager
It consistes of a voter module and a security server module. Security server has
the encryption decryption algorithm and the voting module in cloud manager per-
forms the voting to check whether the share key holder is authentic or not. System
reliability is increased by using the voting technique. It is assumed that the com-
munication channel between the client and cloud manager is secure. Figure 3.1
shows the different modules in the cloud manager.
The proposed technique is suggested for the cloud systems using symmetric en-
cryption.
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Figure 3.1: Cloud manager
3.4 Share Renewal Phase
The keys are assumed to be stored in a hierarchical way. The secondary key
manager distributes the shares to the primary key holders. Primary key holders
in turn distribute the secret to the secondary key holders. The shared keys will
have a crypto period. When this period is about to expire all the shares will be
renewed. The values of shares that the share holders are having should also be
monitored from time to time since there may be a possibility of some of the shares
being modified by the attackers. Figure 3.2 shows how the primary and secondary
share holders are monitored by the log editor.
3.5 Overview of voting technique
Security and privacy of users data is preserved in the proposed technique by the
replication of key share among several clouds, bu the use of the secret sharing
approach, and using a voting method to check the integrity of shares. Figure 3.3
shows how the voting is performed by the voter module in cloud manager.
21
3.6 Working of proposed system
Figure 3.2: Proposed key management scheme in cloud
3.6 Working of proposed system
3.6.1 File Upload
When the cloud user wants to submit a file to a cloud first the file is forwarded
to the cloud manager. Security module in cloud manager generates the key and
encrypts the file using the encryption algorithm as shown and then forwards the
key to key management module. Encrypted file is forwarded to the cloud data
storage center. Key management module divides the key into number of shares.
Sends a master key to the cloud user and distributes all the remaining keys to the
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Figure 3.3: Voter in the cloud manager module
ShareHolderServers. All the primary share holders and secondary share holders
are monitored from time to time to ensure that their values arenot modified by
attacker.
Figure 3.4 shows the data communication in file upload process. The file upload
consists of following communications:
1 User requests to upload a file in cloud system.
2(a) Encrypts the file. Forwards the shares to the secondary key manager.
2(b) Forwards the master key to the cloud user.
2(c) Forwads the encrypted file to the data storage server.
3 Key manager distributes the shares among the share key holders.
3.6.2 File Download
When the cloud user wants to download a file that is stored in cloud file name and
shared master key are entered by cloud user. Download request is forwarded to key
management server. Key management server requests all the ShareHolderServers
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Figure 3.4: Communication in file Upload
to forward their part of keys that correspond to the file name required to it.Key
management server combines all the shares to generate the 2nd level keys and
forwards the key to the security server Security server combines the master key
with other secondary key to generate the main key. The file is decrypted and is
sent to the cloud user.
Figure 3.5 shows the process of file downloading. It consists of the following
data communication:
1(a) Request to the security server for file downloading.
1(b) Request to cloud user to provide master key that was given in the encryption
process.
1(c)Master Key provided by cloud user.
2(a) Request to data storage server to send the encrypted file as requested by
user.
2(b) Data storage server sends encrypted file to cloud storage server.
3(a)Security server enquires the secondary key from the key manager.
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Figure 3.5: Communication in file download
4(a)Key Manager requests the share from the different share holders.
4(b) Share holder servers forward their shares corresponding to the user to the
key manager.
5 Key manager combines all the shares and sends it to security server.
6 Security server combines the master key provided by the user and the secondary
key provided by key management server and generates the actual key. Then,it
decrypts the user file stored in cloud and send it to the user.
3.7 Advantages of the proposed technique over
existing techniques
1. Existing techniques are centralized in nature . We try to provide to provide
a distributed approach for key management.
2. Our technique provides fault tolerance to byzantine attacks, data modifica-
tion and server colluding attacks.
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3. Reliabily of the system is increased by using the voting technique to ensure
that the shares does not get modified by the attacker.
4. After a pre decided crypto time, the shares are renewed in order to ensure
the security of user data if in case some of the shares get compromised.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have proposed a system which removes the drawbacks of some
of the existing cloud systems.New modules are added to the existing system to im-
prove the reliability and security of the existing cloud systems that use symmetric
key encryption tecniques to ensure data security.
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Chapter 4
Implementation and results
4.1 Simulation Environment
The implementation is done using the following tool and techniques:
 CloudSim
 Amazon Web Services
 Jswings
Cloud Sim
 CloudSim is a web app that runs in avirtual machineon theAmazon Web
Services (AWS)cloud.
 It allows users to launch, terminate and monitor virtual machines in the
AWS cloud.
 Different configurations can be launched, depending on the requirements,
and available machines on the cloud.
 Each CloudSim configuration maps to a constellation, which are collections
of multiple virtual machines running together.
4.2 Results
Proposed technique is implemented with different file size ranges from 100KB to
50MB and we try to find out performance comparison between a existing technique
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and the proposed technique.The key provided from AWS is the token that allow
CloudSim to access AWS on behalf of the AWS user. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2
shows the snapshots of how the key is divided into several shares and is again
combined to generate the oroginal key. For our implementation 128 bit key is
used and n=128.
Figure 4.1: Snapshot of key generation
Table 4.1 and figure 4.3 represents the time taken to split a 128 bit key into
10 pieces for different threshold values.
Table 4.1: Key dispersal for a key into 10 shares
Threshold(k) Time(ms)
5 4.56
6 4.08
7 3.39
8 2.50
9 3.41
10 2.26
Table 4.2 and figure 4.4 represents the time taken to combine the shares for
different threshold values.
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Figure 4.2: Snapshot of key splitting
Figure 4.3: Key dispersal for a 128 bit key with n=10
File Upload Time-It includes the time to encrypt the file as requested by
the client.It is the time between the points when user requests the cloud system
to upload the file and the time when the tasks of encryption and generating key
shares actually finishes and the encrypted file is actually stored in the cloud data
storage. Figure 4.5 shows the time taken for file uploading for different file sizes.
File download time- It includes time to collect the shares, generate the
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Table 4.2: Key recovery time from shares
Threshold(k) Time(ms)
5 .79
6 .75
7 .76
8 .073
9 .74
10 .77
Figure 4.4: Key recovery from shares for a 128 bit key with n=10
secondary key, merge the master key and the secondary key and time to decrypt
the input file. It is the time between the two points when the user makes a request
to download a file and user actually receives his file. Figure 4.6 shows tthe time
taken for file downloading for different file sizes.
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Figure 4.5: Size vs Time for file uploading
Figure 4.6: Size vs Time for file downloading
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusion
Key management is the toughest part to manage in cryptosystems. In the cloud
platform, there is always a possibility of insider attack or outsider attack. Keys can
be accessed or stolen by employees without the knowledge of end users. Our aim is
to provide secrecy to the data as well as keys that are stored in cloud systems. Our
proposed technique provides better data security and key management in cloud
systems. This technique also provides better security against byzantine failure,
server coluding and data modification attacks.
5.2 Future work
In future, this work can be extended to use some other secret sharing schemes
which are more effecient so that the performance of proposed system can be further
improved. In addition to this, the proposed technique can be extended to work
with asymmetric encryption algorithms.
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